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BOOK REVIEW 
IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PRO­
CESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD. By A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., 
New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. 1978. Pp. vii, 512. 
For most of American history, the legal status of black peo-
ple was separate and clearly not equal to the status enjoyed by 
whites. In the Matter of Color,1 by A. Leon Higginbotham,• ex­
plores the origin of the laws which governed slavery in the 
American colonies. His work examines fundamental issues in le­
gal and social history, and raises new questions about the law's 
role in determining the future of race relations in this society. 
In the Matter of Color is the first volume of a series which 
will examine the legal underpinnings of racial injustices in 
America. The study begins in 1619, the year blacks arrived in 
Virginia, and will end with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. This first work explores the early American legislative 
and judicial acts which formed the basis for the legal treatment 
of slaves and their descendants. Higginbotham attempts to de­
termine the origin of slavery in English colonial America by 
comparing the development of English slave law with that of the 
American colonies. 
In examining the treatment of slavery in colonial America, 
Hil(l(inhotham undertakes separate analyses of the laws of six 
repret1entative colon ies. Among the colonies studied are Virginia, 
South Carolina, and Georgia, colonies which showed increasing 
de1treet1 of harshness and severity in determining the character 
of Rlavery, end Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, 
whkh demonstrated an ambivalence regarding slavery. 
While this has a certain symmetry, three slave and three 
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free states, one might have wished for a much broader study. 
There are other states with interesting histories of race relations 
that deserve exploration: Rhode Island, a New England colony 
that in the seventeenth century attempted to outlaw slavery and 
the foreign slave trade, only to become in the eighteenth century 
a state with thriving plantations worked by slave labor;3 North 
Carolina, whose laws were among the first to allow free Negroes 
to vote, a tradition which continued until 1835;" New Jersey, 
where there is evidence that some slaves were legally permitted 
to vote in general  elections;" or Maine, New Hampshire and Ver­
mont, which by the end of the eighteenth century accorded their 
small black population almost tota l  de jure equality with the 
white population.8 Interesting as these possibilities are, Judge 
Higginbotham's state selections are sufficiently descriptive to al­
low analysis of the law's response. to demographic and economic 
conditions and the role of the non-English settlement in devel­
oping the law of slavery and race. Together, the six states Hig­
ginbotham has chosen present a p icture of our young nation 
groping from uncertain treatment of slavery toward two differ­
ent legal and social viewpoints. Insofar as Higginbotham's 
description of the e$l'ly development of slavery goes, it is accu­
rate. The questions this essay raises are whether that description 
is complete and what issues it leaves for further study. 
The remainder of this essay is divided into four parts, the 
first of which will suggest that Higginbotham's analysis is incom­
plete as a history of the law of slavery. The second part of this 
essay will suggest that Higginbotham's examination of the ori­
gins and development of English law relating to slavery over­
looks the virulence of English xenophobia as a factor in the 
American approbation of slavery as a legitimate status under 
la�. T�e thir� part. w�ll suggest the types of data that would ass1�t m �akmg H1ggmbotham's analysis complete. The final 
section will consist of a brief conclusion offering suggestions as 
3. R. Cottrol,
_
The Afro-Yankees, Providence's Black Communit in the Antebel-lum Era ch. I passim (forthcoming). y 
4· I. Berlin, Slaves Without Masters: The Free Negro in the Antebellum South 190 (1974). 
5. Wright, Negro Suffrage in New Jersey 1776-187S 33 J N H' t l73 174 (1948). • . egro 1s • , 
6. L. Litwack, North of Slavery· The Negro 
· th F S 263 (1969). 
 m e ree tates, 1790-1860, at 75, 91, 
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to what In the Matter of Color portends for the work of future 
historians. 
I. SLAVERY AND LAW: THE PROBLEM CONSIDERED 
Higginbotham's treatment of the law of slavery in early 
America focuses upon the status and control of slaves and the 
discriminatory treatment to which they were subjected. Admit­
tedly, In the Matter of Color accurately documents the law, but 
it does not completely assess the condition of slavery in early 
America. The massive amount of legal and social data relevant 
to a discussion of early American slavery remains underexplored. 
Thus, Judge Higginbotham's emphasis upon the institutional 
evolution of slavery invites consideration of the larger sociologi­
cal character and effects of slave laws. 
The editorial choices Higginbotham employs are illustrated 
by his consideration of the status of slaves as real or personal 
chattel. He notes, for example, that in South Carolina slaves 
with real property status theoretically held a higher position 
under the law than slaves with chattel property status.7 In ac­
tual practice, however, "South Carolinians disregarded the free­
hold definition of slavery and treated slaves as personal and 
chattel property."8 Whether labeled chattels or real property, 
the disabilities of slavery persisted. Almost certainly no change 
was intended in the life of the slave. What effect then was in­
tended in the life of the slave owner? 
Higginbotham's chapter on Virginia might well have been 
the proper place to further examine the question of real versus 
chattel property. As Higginbotham notes, Virginia's 1705 slave 
code "became a model code for other colonies.,,. The practical 
distinction between chattel and real property was that chattel 
property might be sold to satisfy the debts of the owner's estate; 
real property could be sold to satisfy a mortgage on that prop­
erty, but was to be preserved if possible.10 This distinction may 
have m ade no difference in the case of slave property. A 1794 
case, Walden v. Payne,11 explained: 
7. Higginbotham, supra note l, at 170. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 50. 
10. Id. at 50-51. 
11. 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 1 (1794), reprinted in 1 H. Catterall, Judicial Cases Concerning 
1110 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
Slaves from their nature are chattel. They were originally so, 
and the law made them real estate only in particular cases, 
such as in descents etc. But in most other instances, and espe­
cially in the payment of debts, they were declared to be per­
sonal estate. It is true, the law has protected slaves from dis­
tress, or sale, where there is a sufficiency of other personal 
estate to pay debts or levies, and in this respect they differ 
from other chattels; but this qualified exemption does not 
change their nature, or give to them the qualities of real 
property. 12 
Nonetheless, there are indications that the designation of slaves 
as real property was intended to preserve the slaves who made 
the land productive. The fact that slaves were seen as real estate 
only for purposes of descent creates this inference. This point 
inay also be inferred from various court opinions.18 Because Hig­
ginbotham fails to address this issue in greater detail, the reader 
of In the Matter of Color cannot properly judge the signficance 
of the real versus chattel property distinction. 
-
The chapter on Massachusetts furnishes an excellent illus­
tration of the difficulties inherent in trying to deduce social be­
havior from judicial and legislative doctrine. The Puritans intro­
duced slavery in Massachusetts much less ambiguously than did 
authorities in many southern colonies. The legal differentiations 
between slave and free were set forth in 1649, 14 nearly two gen­
erations before that distinction was clearly defined in Virginia 
law.111 However, it is unclear whether Massachusetts' early will­
ingness to differentiate between slave and free affected either 
slavery or race relations. What did have a lasting impact on slav­
ery and race relations in Massachusetts was its small black pop-
1,tlation in the eighteenth century, averaging two percent of the 
total population. 18 This small population worked as servants or 
artisans in individual white households. 
Massachusetts was a society that had slaves; yet it was not a 
Ame���n1��avery and the Negro 103 (1926) (hereinafter cited as Catterall]. 
13 . . Henndon v. Carr, Jefferson 132 (1772), reprinted in 1 Catterall, supra note 11, at 93; Spicer v. Pope, Barradall 232 (1736) reprinted in 1 Catte all t 11 t 87· s · h G ·m J 
' r , supra no e , a , rmt v. ri n, etferson 132 (1772), reprinted in 1 Catterall, supra note 11, at 92-93.  14. S�e �· Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England 63 (1968). 
· 
15. H1ggmbotham, supra note 1, at 38-40. 
16. Id. at 81. 
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slave society. Therefore, Massachusetts law was not designed to 
control slaves as a class; the law's concern was to regulate the 
behavior of individual slaves. The slave transgressor was brought 
before the courts with a concern for his transgression, not for 
the threat he and his class brought to the s ocial order. Judge 
Higginbotham indicates that blacks received harsher treatment 
in Massachusetts than whites who committed similar offenses; it 
is difficult to determine whether this was due to developing ra­
cism, a desire to keep servants in line generally, or traditional 
English xenophobia.17 Unfortunately, there is insufficient data to 
determine the percentage of servants or off e nders who were of 
non-English stock. These questions remain unresolved and are 
perhaps unresolvable. Judge Higginbotham's chapter on Massa­
chusetts, however, does give clear evidence that individual con­
trol rather than control of blacks as a class defined the concern 
of the Massachusetts legal authorities.1• 
Primary and secondary historical sources indicate that 
slaves moved about with a relatively high degree of freedom in 
eighteenth century Massachusetts. The Boston selectmen con­
tinually passed ordinances forbidding slaves from moving about 
at night. 19 The best evidence indicates that these ordinances 
were only minimally enforced. Slaves joined white apprentices 
and indentured servants in the street life of Boston. The lament 
of the colonial commentator that "boys and Negroes" were caus­
ing an uproar was constantly heard,19 and yet this uproar did 
not mobilize the sort of legal and extralegal social controls that 
were the hallmark of the treatment of slaves under plantation 
regimes. 
Instead, sources indicate that slaves petitioned courts for re­
dress of these grievances, and some even obtained their free­
dom. 21 There were courts run by slaves to mete out punishment 
for minor offenses. 22 There was no special law enforcement 
mechanism specially adapted for capturing slaves; instead, con­
stables of the towns had this responsibility and achieved only 
17. See text at notes 27-41 infra. 
18. Higginbotham, supra note 1, at 71-82. 
19. Records of the Boston Selectmen, 1754-1763, at 109 (1887). 
20. L. Greene, supra note 14, at 81. 
21. See generally 4 Catterall, supra note 11. 
22. Platt, Negro Governors, in 4 New Haven Colony Historical Society Papers 
(1900). 
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minimal success. Boston became a regional center for runaway 
slaves in New England, and many of these runaways became an 
integral part of lower class street life. 23 
The lives of lower class whites, particularly poor appren­
tices, and black slaves paralleled one another well into the eight­
eenth century, even though legal distinctions between the two 
groups were clearly defined in the seventeenth century. No for­
mal or informal rules divided white work from black work. 
Slaves, indentured servants, and apprentices worked at the same 
jobs in Massachusetts, and usually next to one another. Whites 
and blacks often ran away together from their masters. Again, 
the distinction between a slave society and a society with slaves 
is crucial. Massachusetts enjoyed a freedom of association un­
hampered by what would have been the inevitable legal and so­
cial restrictions of a slave society. 114 
The exact limits of that freedom of association can be deter­
mined only by painstaking research and analysis of legal and 
other local records, such as court records and records of town 
selectmen. Such records might indicate the identities a nd the 
nature of the punishments of transgressors against the laws or 
reveal pertinent differences in the civil law's treatment o f  blacks 
and whites. Judge Higginbotham's decision not to undertake 
this research is a function of the limited nature of his i nquiry. 
He has described the law of slavery in detail; the description of 
how that law was put into effect is a task for future historians. 
II. FROM XENOPHOBIA TO RACISM 
Higginbotham's treatment of the legal origins of slavery 
forms his best and yet his most problematic work. His chapter 
on South Carolina, for example, shows that South Carolina's pe­
c�liar
.
ly harsh tre�tment of slaves and the slave's powerless posi­
tion m. that society were the cultural and legal offspring of 
Barbadian law and practice. Higginbotham's chapter o n  New 
York shows the influence Dutch settlers had on the law of slav­
ery. He contrasts well the legal distinctions between the Dutch 
colonists' treatment of slavery and that of the English.26 
23. Higginbotham, supra note 1, at 78-80. 
24. See generally L. Greene, supra note 14. 
25. See text at notes 56-60 infra. 
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Higginbotham's exposition on the origms of English atti­
tudes toward slavery as a legal status is, however, significantly 
less defined than his showing of Dutch and Barbadian attitudes 
in New York and South Carolina. This lack of definition is the 
major shortcoming of the book, but is understandable if one 
views In the Matter of Color as "an effort to look at [slave] his­
tory primarily through the special focus of a legal lens."26 Hig­
ginbotham did not intend his work to be a complete picture of 
slavery, but rather a fragment without which the whole cannot 
be complete. When so viewed, In the Matter of Color under­
takes a more difficult task than other works that attempt to 
show the English origins of American slavery. 
English Xenophobia 
Historians of American slavery have long grappled with the 
elusive history of Tudor-Stuart England and its implications for 
the development of American racial values. 27 Most agree that 
English society, as it ventured into New World colonization in 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, had little ex­
perience with slavery.28 Unlike southern Europeans, the English 
lacked familiarity with Africa or her peoples until a relatively 
late period in British history. These facts formed the basis for 
much writing and speculation, especially by comparative histori­
ans, about the origins of Anglo-American racial practice. 
Sociologist Frank Tannenbaum provided an important ser­
vice for students of comparative slavery in his pioneering legal 
history of slavery entitled Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the 
Americas. 28 While much of his work has since been convincingly 
disputed,30 Tannenbaum's study does impart a feeling for the 
differences in slave law that existed in Ibero- and Anglo-Ameri­
can societies. Unlike England, slavery was not strange to Iberian 
26. Higginbotham, supra note 1, at 14. 
27. See, e.g., W. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 
1550-1812, at 3-40 (1968). 
28. Id. 
29. F. Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas (1946). 
30. See C. Dexter, Neither Black Nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil 
and the United States (1971). For a good analysis of the problem of comparing the treat­
ment of slaves in a cross-culture perspective, see Genovese, The Treatment of Slaves in 
Different Countries: Problems in the Appl ications of the Comparative Method, in Slav­
ery in the New World: A Reader in Comparative History 202-11 (L. Foner & E. Genovese 
eds. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Foner & Genovese). 
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law or custom. Enslavement of blacks predated Iberian explora­
tion of the New World by at least one century and, by the time 
the New World was encountered, Spain and Portugal had both 
indigenous slave and free black populations. 31 Iberian law regu­
lated the status and conduct of these populations, and often es­
tablished a clear second-class status for blacks.82 
In contrast, England lacked this traditional contact with 
non-Europeans, and ventured into Africa and America with no 
heritage of slavery.88 This lack of experience left a v acuum in 
English jurisprudence. The common law's dictate that law devel­
ops through actual cases forced the American colonies to modify 
English traditions to accommodate burgeoning slave societies. 
If that development could not depend upon legal traditions 
and social mores that antedated American exploration, it never­
theless was not a tabula rasa, totally divorced from previous En­
glish history. Historian Winthrop Jordan, in White Over Black: 
American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812,34 a dvanced 
the theory that the lack of contact with Africans and the relative 
isolation from dark-skinned people generally predisposed the 
English toward a virulent anti-black prejudice. The harshness of 
the American slave regime was thus predictable, perhaps 
inevitable. 36 
If England was predisposed toward racism, that racism, 
31. F. Mauro, Le Portugal et L'Atlantique au XVII Siecle, 1570-1670 (1960). 
32. Id. 
33. F. Tannenbaum, supra note 29. 
34. W. Jordan, supra note 27, at 3-40. 
35. Jordan's work stressed the value the English traditionally placed o n  fair skin, 
and the ethnographic shock English slave traders expressed on first viewing the peoples 
an� cultures of �est Africa 
.
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He placed great weight on negative connotations of the term "black" as traditionally used in the English 
language. Scholars of the slave experience in the Americas had long felt b o un d  by the 
perceptions of scholars like Jordan and Tannenbaum who described radicall y  different Iberian and E�glish traditions and argued that the different laws and custom s  of Eng­land and Spam produced radically different slave societies. This older view has been supplanted �y scholars who have tended to look at cultural (including legal) determi­nan� of racial and s l�ve p�actices, and who have emphasized instead the role of eco­nomic and demographic variables in their histories of slave societies. Thus many histori­a
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nonetheless, provided no strong foundation for slavery. Slavery, 
while not totally unknown in early feudal England's law and 
custom, was more of an anomaly than standard practice. ae Fur­
thermore, by the twelfth century, slavery had been effectively 
eliminated within English society.87 Of greater significance in the 
English historical tradition was a feudal social and economic sys­
tem over which the common law, and later the courts of equity, 
superimposed systems of mutually reciprocating rights and obli­
gations upon all members of society. While the exact legal status 
of the medieval English villein remains a matter of dispute, he 
nonetheless enjoyed legal protections which extended to his life 
and his enjoyment of property rights.88 The villein's rights far 
exceeded those accorded slaves in most American colonies and 
states. B y  the time the English explored the Americas, the whole 
of English society enjoyed, at least nominally, free legal status. 
Combined with English freedom was a virulent xenophobia 
that had been exacerbated during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. England, the first Protestant country, found itself at 
odds with the Catholic countries of Europe, in particular France 
and Spain. Furthermore, England battled the Irish and the 
Scots, two peoples still not totally subsumed under British rule. 
Mary Tudor's persecution of English Protestants, Elizabeth's ex­
ecution of Mary and conflicts with Catholic Spain, the heavy­
handedness of the Stuart kings and Cromwell's revolution all 
were part of a background that reinforced a strong suspicion of 
the outsider. Especially important was England's control of Ire­
land, a control which gave the English their first experience with 
subjugating a foreign people. 89 
The harshness of Cromwell's conquest of Ireland illustrates 
the predisposition of the English toward those who would fall 
under English domain. Having exploited and developed its New 
World colonies more slowly than Spain, England began in ear­
nest the process of settlement of the New World in the 
seventeeth century. Irish rebels who resisted Cromwell's subju­
gation of their homeland were one of the first groups so settled 
36. 1 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 35-37, 412, 424 (2d ed. 
1898); 2 id, at 472, 529. 
37. 2 id. at 529. 
38. Id. at 412-32. 
39. A. Harding, A Social History of English Law 298 (1966); C. Smith, The Great 
Hunger 26-27 (1962). 
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by the English."'0 In the 1640's, thousands of Irish prisoners of 
war, as well as kidnapped Irish and some impoverished English 
youth, were shipped to the British West Indies to labor in the 
sugar cane fields of the newly emerging English planter elite. 
The treatment of these Irish servants represented a major break 
with the English tradition of personal liberty, for the treatment 
was undeniably harsh and far in excess of that allowed among 
the English themselves. 41 
The Evolution of English Xenophobia: Virginia 
In America, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
brought about a transformation of the general English hostility 
toward outsiders into a more specific racism that singled out 
blacks for special treatment socially and legally. Higginbotham 
exposes the effects of this metamorphosis, but, like others, has 
found its development elusive. 
Higginbotham's treatment of the origins of American slav­
ery might, therefore, have been well served by some inquiry into 
English xenophobia and its possible effects on American atti­
tudes and laws. Such an investigation might best have been con­
ducted by an examination of Virginia, for as Higginbotham cor­
rectly states, Virginia "pioneered a legal process that assured 
blacks a uniquely degraded status .... Just as they emulated 
other aspects of Virginia's policies, many colonies would also fol­
low Virginia's leadership in slavery law."42 
By the seventeenth century, English law and practice were 
40. R. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves (1972). 
41. Dunn's account of Irish life in mid-seventeenth century Barbados leaves little 
doubt concerning the English predisposition towards cruelty to those, white as well as 
black, that they deemed different from themselves: 
During the initial stage of sugar production, when the white servants 
ro
.
und themselve� toiling in the same field gangs with black slaves, they became 
wild �nd unruly m the extreme . Some of the English and Irish youths shipped over m the 1640s and 1650s had been kidnapped . To be "barbadosed" in the seventeenth century meant the same as to b e  "shanghaied" in the twentieth .  It would be hard to say whether the London thieves and whores rounded up for transpor�tion to "the Barbados Islands" o r  the Scottish and Irish soldiers captured m Cromwell's campaigns and sent over as military prisoners were any less hostile and rebellious than the Negroe s  dragged 
· h 
· f Af · . . . m c ams rom rica. Irish Cath.ohcs constituted the largest block of servants on the island, and they were cordially loathed by their English masters. 
Id. at 69. 
42. Higginbotham, supra note 1, at 19. 
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actively chauvinistic, militantly intolerant of non-Englishmen 
and non-English ideas. The laws of early Virginia reflected that 
pattern. The first royal charter authorizing the Virginia colony 
in 1606,43 and charters which followed," established the ascen­
dency of English laws and customs. The "liberties of a British 
subject" were guaranteed for those who would live in the colony 
and for their descendents, u but it became clear that such liber­
ties were guaranteed o nly for those who were already British 
subjects. The Virginia charters were meant to safeguard for En­
glishmen the rights of Englishmen, not to promise the rights of 
Englishmen to others. Virginia laws, by direction of the crown, 
were no more expansive than English laws and, perhaps equally 
important, were no less restrictive. 
Virginia's early intolerance of outsiders and outside ideas 
was not, however, merely a function of orders from the crown. 
Virginia was intolerant because English settlers in Virginia 
shared the xenophobia of those who remained in England. The 
English practice of treating foreigners, particularly the Irish, dif­
ferently was transplanted in Virginia. Thus, the assembly re­
solved, in 1642, that servants who had entered the colony with­
out a written indenture would serve four years if aged twenty or 
above, five years if between the ages of twelve and twenty, and 
until the age of nineteen if aged twelve or under." Yet, in 1654, 
the assembly explained that "the act for servants without inden­
tures [was] only [for] the benefitt [sic] of our own nation";47 
Irish servants without indenture would now serve six years if 
above sixteen years old, and until twenty-four years of age if 
under sixteen.48 In 1657, the assembly reiterated this position, 
reenacting the 1654 act but adding the proviso that "all aliens 
[shall]  be included in this act."49 
Two years later, in 1659, the "Act for Irish Servants" was 
43. Letters Patent to Sir T homas Gates, Sir George Sommers, and others for two 
several Colonies and Plantations, to be made in Virginia, and other parts and Territories 
of America (April 10, 1606), reprinted in 1 W. Hening, Statutes at Large of Virginia 57 
(1823) [hereinafter cited as Hening, Statutes]. 
44. 1 Hening, Statutes, supra note 43, at 57-113. 
45. See, e.g., Letters Patent to Sir Thomas Gates, ch. XV, reprinted in I Hening, 
Statutes, supra note 43, at 64. 
46. Act XXVI, 1642-43, reprinted in 1 Hening, Statutes, supra note 43, at 257. 
47. Act VI, 1654-55, reprinted in 1 Hening, Statutes supra note 43, at 411. 
48. Id. 
49. Act LXXXV, 1657-58, reprinted in 1 Hening, Statutes, supra note 43, at 471. 
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repealed.110 The assembly found that the act had "carried with it 
both rigour and inconvenience, many by the length of time they 
have to serve being discouraged from comeing [sic] into the 
country, And by that meanes [sic] the peopling of the country 
retarded. "111 Whatever the satisfactions, therefore, of treating 
Irish and other aliens differently from Englishmen, economic ne­
cessity mandated that "no servant comeing [sic] into the coun­
try without indentures ; . .  shall serve longer then [sic] those of 
our own country, of the like age."112 Still, the new act repealing 
the act for Irish Servants did not apply to blacks, for it con­
cerned those servants "of what christian nation [what]soever."H 
Thus, while white alien servants b egan to acquire treatment 
more equal to the English, blacks were left to endure all the in­
dignities the law might impose. 
Gradually, and largely for economic reasons, white non-En­
glishmen were accorded the opportunity to acquire some rights 
which the English enjoyed.14 By 1680, the position of the Irish 
and other aliens had dramatically improved. At last they were 
capable of attaining all the rights of Englishmen. As Higginbo­
tham points out, the position of blacks meanwhile had deterio­
rated. Ambiguity had given way to the passage of Virginia's first 
slave code,1111 which solidified the inferior position of blacks. 
Paradoxically, then, the Virginia into which blacks were 
first brought in 1619 was one marked by xenophobia and yet was 
less harsh to blacks than the Virginia of 1680. If economic neces­
sity lessened the impact of English xenophobia on non-English 
whites, who were urged to emigrate, it could not ameliorate the 
harsh treatment of blacks. Indeed, economic necessity dictated 
the softening of status distinctions among whites and the sharp­
ening of the distinctions between blacks and whites. 
50. Act XIV, 1659-60, reprinted in 1 Hening, Statutes, supra note 43, at 538-39. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 539. 
53. Id. 
54. T?e Virgin�a assembly
_ 
was quite explicit in explaining the economic rationale for �xpandmg the rights of white non-Englishmen .  See Act VII, 1671 reprinted in 2 Henmg, Statutes, supra note 43, at 289, 290 and Act II, 1680, reprint�d in 2 Hening, �tatutt:s, s�pra note 43, at 464. Compare this later treatment to that allowed under ear­her leg1slat1on, e.g., Act CXVIII 1657-58 reprint d · 2 H 
· S 43 at 486. 
' ' e in enmg, tatutes, supra note , 
55. Act X, 1680, reprinted in 2 Hening, Statutes, supra note 43, at 481. 
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III. CULTURE AND NECESSITY: BALANCING THE DETERMINANTS OF 
THE LA w OF SLAVERY 
Higginbotham's discussion of the evolving legal status of 
blacks in New York under Dutch and Anglo-American rule dem­
onstrates the pitfalls and complexities of investigating the legal 
history of slavery. These difficulties are multiplied both by the 
mixed cultural and legal heritage of New York and by the rapid­
ity of social and economic evolutions there. New York is a fertile 
field for students of comparative legal history, a field circum­
scribed by a longstanding debate over whether cultural con­
straints, including law, or economic and demographic variables 
played the dominant role in affecting the slave's condition. In 
any event, legal history needs as a complement the examination 
of other cultural manifestations and economic-demographic vari­
ables that bear on the society. 
The chapter on New York begins with a description of 
rights that blacks, slave, free, and quasi-free, enjoyed under 
Dutch rule. There existed a half-slave, half-free status that per­
mitted black people to live by themselves and work for them­
selves while paying tribute to the government of New Amster­
dam. Blacks could testify against whites in trials. Free blacks 
could serve in the militia. These legal rights excluded those en­
joyed by blacks in the English colonies. 
Yet the significance of differences between Dutch slave 
practice in New Netherlands and English practice in the rest of 
the continent remains unclear. Higginbotham contrasts the legal 
rights of blacks in New York with the rights of their brethren in 
the southern colonies. A direct comparison with New England 
would have been more appropriate. While the laws in the New 
England colonies were somewhat less liberal than in New 
Netherlands, available evidence does not indicate that social 
practices were significantly harsher. Arrangements that permit­
ted slaves in New England to work independently and pay their 
owners a portion of their earnings were frequent.56 Courts in 
New England heard the testimony of blacks against whites.117 
The Puritan concern for preserving the slave family seems to 
56. See, e.g., V. Smith, A Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Venture, A Na­
tive of Africa (1798), which presents the case of a New England slave who earned money 
and ultimately acquired his freedom. 
57. See 4 Catterall, supra note 11. 
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have been as strong as the Dutch concern. Perhaps the central 
question that needs to be asked about the Dutch slave regime in 
the early seventeenth century in New Netherlands is to w hat ex­
tent Dutch legal and cultural patterns reflected the lesser need 
for stringent social control of slaves in the northern colonies 
generally. 
The question is not easily answered, but the area of compar­
ative slavery that has been best developed is the comparison be­
tween slavery in the United States and in Latin America, and 
the scholarship in that area may reveal some useful concepts. 
For over a generation Tannenbaum's legal history of slavery, 
Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas, convinced schol­
ars of the mildness of slave regimes in Latin America. Subse­
quent scholarship has indicated that formal law often had less to 
do with the daily living conditions of the slave than did the pro­
portion of slaves in the population, the type of labor in which 
they engaged, and the relative availability of replacements, via 
the African slave trade, for slaves killed from overwork .1111 As 
Higginbotham demonstrates, even in English colonies, the range 
of slave treatment was heavily influenced by economic and dem­
ographic variables. 
A valuable supplement to Higginbotham's discussion of 
Dutch slavery in New Netherlands would have an examination 
of the works of Dutch sociologist Haramnus Hoetink on the rad­
ically different p atterns of slave treatment in the Dutch colonies 
of Surinam and Curacao.119 Hoetink, who did not discuss the in­
fluences of Dutch law, suggested that the relative harshness of 
the slave system in Surinam, compared to the relative mildness 
of slave treatment in Curacao, was a function both of economics 
and the relative percentages of black population in the two 
colonies.60 
Sti�l, despite the. ascendancy of w hat might be terme
d the 
econom1c-demograph1c approach to the comparative history of 
slavery, cultural factors, including legal ones, are useful indica-
. 58. Se�, e.g., Genovese, The Treatment of Slaves in Different Countries: Problems in the Applications of the Comparative Method, in Foner & Gen t 30 at 
202_ 1 l. ovese, supra no e , 
59. Hoetink, Race Relations in Curacao and Surinam in F & G pra note 30, at 178-88. 
' oner enovese, su 
60. Id. 
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tors. Indeed, the legal factors in various slave societies were 
probably strong indicators of the cultural receptivities of nations 
toward outsiders. These legal factors may not have been strong 
enough to defeat the economic and demographic constraints that 
shaped the many slave systems of the New World, but neverthe­
less deserve examination. The liberalism of the Dutch in the 
treatment of slaves in seventeenth century New Netherlands is a 
sharp contrast to the harsher slave codes of the English colonies, 
an indication of differences between the cultural-legal heritage 
of England and the Netherlands. 
By the early eighteenth century, New York had perhaps the 
harshest slave regime of the northern states. The relatively mild 
slave practices of the Dutch had been replaced under English 
rule with a confrontational slave system, which in New York 
City was complete with slave revolts and harsh public executions 
of rebellious slaves. Higginbotham has correctly resisted the 
temptation to attribute these changes to the shift from Dutch to 
English rule. The late seventeenth and early eighteenth centu­
ries were a time of increasingly more pronounced racial differen­
tiation in America, and New York's history was a part of this 
process. The proportion of slaves in New York during this pe­
riod stirred white fears and increased the desire to strengthen 
social and legal controls on slaves. 
The New York chapter demonstrates that In the Matter of 
Color offers a description of the legal actions of early Americans, 
a description that cannot be viewed as dispositive of all the is­
sues surrounding the law of slavery. In the Matter of Color 
should be an invitation to practices of different disciplines to 
further study the law of slavery. 
IV. SLAVERY, RACE AND LAW: THE NEXT CHAPTER 
If Higgingotham's discussion of slavery in New York raises 
interesting questions that bear further exploraton, one aspect of 
the legal treatment of blacks in post-emancipation New York 
may invite even closer scrutiny. From the late eighteenth cen­
tury until 1822, free black men and white men enjoyed equal 
access to the ballot.81 In 1822, the New York legislature inter-
61. Fox, The Negro Vote in Old New York, in Free Blacks in America,1800-1860, 
at 95-112 (J. Bracey, E. Rudwick & A. Meir eds. 1970). 
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vened. The previous $100 property qualification was eliminated 
for white men and was increased to $250 for blacks.82 Higgin­
botham treats this as a relatively straightforward piece of legal 
history. It is not. 
It is instead one of the more underexplored and more im­
portant chapters in the historical and political sociology of the 
Northeast and of the nation. The relatively small number of free 
black voters in the Northeast in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries had pronounced Federalist sympathies and 
voting patterns. 63 The numbers of these free black voters were 
small but highly visible, and Democratic party officials tended to 
use blacks as scapegoats for Democratic election losses. e• This 
tendency was particularly well developed in Ne-:v York, where 
Democrats charged that the black vote swung the state assembly 
election to the Federalists in 1813. •11 Throughout much of the 
Northeast, including New York, Democrats pressed for the abo­
lition of the right of black suffrage.86 In New York, due t o  Feder­
alist pressure to keep black suffrage rights, a compromise devel­
oped. Black men would need $250 in property to vote, and white 
men would need none. 
Thus, one of the more striking anomalies of nineteenth cen­
tury America developed. The Democrats, who pressed hard to 
eliminate the legal disabilities of poor whites, were anxious to 
mandate de jure as well as de facto second class citizenship for 
free blacks. That the Democratic party became the patron of the 
white working class and poor undoubtedly increased the ten­
sions between these groups and blacks, particularly between 
Irish immigrants and the free black populations of states like 
New York. Research into the role of Democratic politicians and 
jurists in maintaining social and legal disabilities of free black 
populations in the northern states is still relatively underdevel­
oped, and promises rewards for those seeking to understand the 
origins of racial conflicts in the northern United States. 
In the Matter of Color should not be criticized for failing to 
give greater attention to extralegal factors that abound in the 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
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development of the law. Higginbotham's task was large enough 
in simply detailing the early American law of slavery, for that is 
a subject about which the body of knowledge prior to his work 
was woefully inadequate. Other legal historians must take his 
work as a starting point for detailed state and local studies, to 
find out how the laws were enforced and whether extralegal fac­
tors outweighed the strictures of the law as passed and as de­
cided by legislators and judges. Judge Higginbotham suggests, as 
have others, that peoples may act worse than their laws demand, 
but that no people will act better.97 It is the task of legal histori­
ans who follow to discover whether the people of early America 
lived up to the level of their laws or, for better or worse, sur­
passed them. 
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